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Abstract
This article analyses the evolution of SOE reform in China, especially focusing on 
how SOEs beneﬁted from the Chinese government's favourable policies and how 
such SOE favouritism impacts the Chinese macro economy and causes social prob-
lems. The article outlines SOE reform before Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took over 
the leadership of the country in 2002–2003 and investigates the nominal as well as 
the real performance of SOEs since 2003. The article also discusses the nature and 
functions of Chinese SOEs as well as the future direction of Chinese SOE reform.
Keywords: China, SOE, reform, favouritism, privately owned enterprises 
Introduction
In 1979, China adopted the reform and opening policy and started its 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
One important component of the reform programme was the reform of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Initially, the idea was to revitalize the 
inefﬁcient SOE sector by expanding the SOEs' autonomy in operational 
decisions. But the reform was not successful. Later on, the goal of the 
reform was changed, to privatize some of the loss-making SOEs and to 
allow the private economy to prosper. 
After three decades of market-oriented economic reform, more than 
40 per cent of China's non-agricultural GDP is still accounted for by the 
visible state sector—SOEs and entities directly controlled by SOEs (Sza-
mosszegi and Kyle 2011). Furthermore, Chinese SOEs dominate strategic 
sectors such as the oil, power and telecommunication industries, the 
so-called 'commanding heights' of the economy. Since 2003, the overall 
ﬁnancial performance of Chinese SOEs has looked outstanding in terms 
of growth of assets and proﬁts. However, SOEs have been the target of 
serious criticism from intellectuals and the public in China. 
To understand this paradoxical situation, this article analyses SOE 
reform in China, especially focusing on how the SOEs beneﬁted from 
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the Chinese government's favourable policies and how such favouritism 
impacts the Chinese macro economy and causes social problems. In the 
ﬁnal section, we discuss the future direction of Chinese SOE reform. 
The Past: China's SOE Reform before 2003
After Mao's death in 1976, when Deng Xiaoping became the de facto 
supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), his major goal 
was to lay the foundation for rapid and sustained economic growth. 
Supported by other reform-oriented CCP leaders, Deng Xiaoping in 
1979 launched the economic reform and open door policies. However, in 
accordance with his pragmatic and strategic approach, Deng postponed 
the urban sector reform, including the SOE reform, until 1984 when the 
huge success of the rural sector reform provided sufﬁcient conﬁdence 
and a solid economic foundation to push reforms to a higher level. 
The Efﬁciency Problem of Chinese SOEs
The biggest problem that China's SOEs faced in the early 1980s was low 
efﬁciency. Under the central planning system, there was no competition 
because the whole economy was publicly owned and state-run; therefore 
the low efﬁciencies of Chinese SOEs could hardly be revealed. After the 
reform and opening up began, it soon became clear that Chinese SOEs 
had difﬁculties adjusting to the changing reality, including increased 
competition from collectively owned enterprises (COEs), privately 
owned enterprises (POEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). In 
general, low efﬁciency seems to be endemic to any centrally planned 
economy. In the case of Chinese SOEs, two major factors contributed 
to the inefﬁciency problem: the lack of incentives in the SOE workforce 
and the heavy social burdens the SOEs shouldered. 
Why did the Chinese SOE workforce lack incentives? The reason was 
that under China's central planning system, SOEs were actually 'work-
shops' of the big 'national factory', passively performing the production 
tasks ordered by the central planners. All proﬁts had to be handed in to the 
central government and there were no performance measures. Workers 
enjoyed job security, so there was no incentive for workers to work harder 
to improve efﬁciency. In the ﬁrst phase of reform, although SOEs were 
in competition with COEs, POEs and FIEs, the SOEs received favourable 
treatment from the government and enjoyed soft budget constraints; so, 
there was still no real incentive for workers to improve efﬁciency because 
they knew the SOEs would be bailed out if the SOE made losses. 
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There were two types of social burdens on Chinese SOEs. One was 
that Chinese SOEs were in general overstaffed to provide as much em-
ployment as possible. The other was that Chinese SOEs undertook many 
social functions such as running schools, hospitals, cinemas, canteens 
and even convenience stores. One reason for taking on these social func-
tions was that this maintained social stability, as SOE workers would 
have almost all their social needs met within their danwei (i.e., working 
unit). In addition, some SOEs located in remote or isolated 'third line' 
regions had to provide those social functions for their employees simply 
because there were no alternatives. 
The Two Phases of the Reform before 2003
The reform before 2003 can be roughly divided into two phases. The ﬁrst 
phase was from 1979 to 1992 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. 
During the ﬁrst phase the emphasis of the reform was on enterpriza-
tion, that is, transforming the SOEs from the government's afﬁliated 
organizations under the centrally planned economy into autonomous, 
productive enterprises under the planned commodity economy.1 The 
culmination of this reform was the promulgation of the 'Law of Indus-
trial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People' in 1988.2 The key to such 
a transformation was thought to be incentivizing SOE managers and 
employees. To do so, the Chinese government undertook two experi-
ments. One was to adopt the policy of 'fang quan rang li' from 1979 to 
1986, which aimed to delegate more power to and leave more proﬁts 
for the enterprises. The other was to implement the 'contract manage-
ment responsibility system' from 1987 to 1992. These two experiments 
were effective in boosting the SOEs' production output but not effec-
tive in increasing the government's ﬁscal revenue. This was due to the 
problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard rooted in the 
principal–agent relationship between the government and the SOEs. 
With the fang quan rang li policy, SOE managers, once having gained 
more power and autonomy, were motivated to grab as much as possible 
of the proﬁt that they were required to hand over to the state. Under 
the contract system, SOE managers could bargain with the state for 
conditions in their favour (Lin and Li 2003). 
The second phase was from 1992 to 2002 under Jiang Zemin's lead-
ership. In 1992, following Deng's 'Southern Tour', the Chinese govern-
ment started a new round of SOE reform, which aimed to address the 
property rights issue. The reform theme of this phase can be termed 
corporatization because the overall economic reform was redirected 
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towards establishing a socialist market economy, and the new goal of 
the SOE reform was to transform the SOEs into modern corporations 
characterized by clearly deﬁned property rights, clear-cut responsibil-
ity and authority, and separation of the functions of government and 
enterprises. A major solution was to transform SOEs into stockholding 
companies. To facilitate this transformation, the Chinese government 
issued the Company Law in 1993. However, once the marketization 
reform started, Chinese SOEs appeared to be ineffective and inefﬁcient 
compared with COEs, POEs and FIEs. By the mid-1990s, more than 60 
per cent of the 11,000 largest SOEs were loss-making (SASAC 2008). 
In 1997, the Chinese government gave up the idea of bailing out every 
loss-making SOE and adopted a 'zhua da fang xiao' strategy, namely, 
grasping the big SOEs while letting go of the small ones. The same 
year, the Chinese government implemented a programme to pull the 
big SOEs out of difﬁculties within three years (san nian tuo kun, from 
1998 to 2000). By the end of 2000, this programme was said to have basi-
cally succeeded (SASAC 2008), although the Chinese government and 
people have paid a huge cost, including writing off 1.4 trillion yuan in 
non-performing loans of state-owned banks. 
The Present: SOE Reform under the Hu-Wen 
Administration since 2003
After Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao assumed the leadership roles in 2003, the 
reform of Chinese SOEs entered into its third phase with the establish-
ment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Com-
mission (SASAC) of the State Council. The reform theme of this phase 
can be termed concentration. Under the management of the SASAC, 
Chinese SOEs were concentrated in several strategically important in-
dustries while exiting from areas where SOEs lacked competitiveness. 
Now, state-owned enterprises have absolute control in seven indus-
tries: defence, electricity generation and distribution, petroleum and 
petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and waterway 
transport (World Bank 2012: 105). It is worth noting that there is a com-
mercial orientation to this phase of SOE reform, in the sense that the big 
SOEs which the Chinese government 'grasps', are now expected to act as 
ordinary enterprises and to seek proﬁts. This commercial orientation is a 
natural consequence of the function and purpose of the SASAC,3 which 
is charged with the sole responsibility of supervising the preservation 
and expansion of the value of the state-owned assets of the 114 central 
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enterprises (zhongyang qiye).4 Li Rongrong, the ﬁrst Chairman of the 
powerful SASAC, has repeatedly said that China should develop the 
state-owned economy 'unwaveringly' and 'righteously' (Li 2009).
The Nominal Performance of SOEs since 2003
Entering the new century, Chinese SOEs have morphed from the govern-
ment's loss-making burden into its proﬁt-making favourite. According 
to the 'SASAC Review 2009' (see Table 1), from 2003 to 2009, the total 
number of SOEs decreased from 149,988 to 115,115; however, total SOE 
assets expanded from 19,710.3 billion yuan to 53,537.2 billion yuan, ac-
counting for 18.1 per cent average annual growth; the total revenue of 
SOEs increased from 10,734 billion yuan to 24,200.8 billion yuan, register-
ing a 14.5 per cent annual growth; and the total proﬁts grew from 495.1 
billion yuan to 1,570.3 billion yuan, for a 21.2 per cent annual growth. 
As a result of this performance improvement, the tax contribution of 
the SOEs grew from 810.5 billion yuan in 2003 to 2,279.6 billion yuan in 
2009, with an average annual growth of 18.8 per cent. 





















2003 149,988 19,710.3  10,734.0  495.1  810.5  
2004 137,753 22,308.4 13.2 12,325.4 14.8 752.5 52.0 1,010.7 24.7
2005 127,067 25,372.2 13.7 14,249.0 15.6 968.3 28.7 1,191.9 17.9
2006 119,254 29,011.6 14.3 16,196.9 13.7 1,224.2 26.4 1,393.7 16.9
2007 115,087 35,481.4 22.3 20,082.3 24.0 1,762.5 44.0 1,768.9 26.9
2008 113,731 42,547.3 19.9 22,936.4 14.2 1,330.7 -24.5 2,092.8 18.3
2009 115,115 53,537.2 25.8 24,200.8 5.5 1,570.3 18.0 2,279.6 8.9
Source: SASAC (2010). 
With regard to the central SOEs, i.e., the largest SOEs directly super-
vised by the SASAC of the State Council, their performances appear to 
be excellent (see Table 2). From 2002 to 2009, total assets of the central 
SOEs ballooned from 7.1 trillion yuan to 21 trillion, with an average an-
nual growth of 16.7 per cent; operating revenues rose from 3.4 trillion 
yuan to 12.6 trillion, growing 20.8 per cent annually; proﬁts increased 
from 240.5 billion yuan to 815.1 billion yuan, with 19 per cent annual 
growth; and total tax paid to the state mushroomed from 291.5 billion 
yuan to 1.2 trillion, accounting for a 21.6 per cent annual growth (SASAC 
2010). Over this period, the number of SOEs whose operating revenue 
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exceed 100 billion yuan increased from 6 to 38, while the number of 
Chinese SOEs listed in the Fortune 500 rose from 6 to 30. Further gains 
were achieved in the 2009–2012 period. At the end of 2012, total assets of 
central SOEs had soared to 44.8 trillion yuan. Total operating revenues 
amounted to 22.5 trillion yuan, with proﬁts of 1.3 billion yuan. 
TABLE 2: Major Financial Indicators of China's Central SOEs, 2002–2012 
(billion yuan)









Number of SOEs 
making more 






2002 7,128.5 3,364.3 240.6 291.5 6 6
2003 8,323.2 4,474.8 300.6 356.3 9 8
2004 9,149.4 5,599.7 488.0 465.5 10 10
2005 10,514.8 6,794.5 637.7 578.0 15 13
2006 12,191.5 8,294.0 768.2 682.3 21 16
2007 14,923.1 10,028.2 1,005.6 879.2 26 19
2008 17,628.8 11,870.5 696.2 1,042.6 33 24
2009 21,058.1 12,627.2 815.1 1,147.5 38 30
2010 24,300.0 16,700.0 1,131.5 1,400.0 43 38
2011 28,000.0 20,200.0 917.3 1,700.0 59
2012 44,790.0 22,500.0 1,300.0 1,900.0 65
Sources: SASAC (2010); 2010 ﬁgures are from SASAC websites, available at http://www.
sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n259730/n6633400/13353073.html and http://www.sasac.gov.
cn/n1180/n1566/n259730/n6633400/13225460.html; 2011 ﬁgures are from Caijing, available at: 
http://economy.caijing.com.cn/2012-02-21/111697734.html; the 2012 total assets ﬁgure is from 
Global Times, available at: http://ﬁnance.huanqiu.com/comment/2013-05/3908080.html; the 
other 2012 ﬁnancial ﬁgures are from Xinhua News Agency, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.
com/fortune/2013-03/12/c_124445850.htm.
With this achievement, Li Rongrong, the 'Big Boss' of China's large 
SOEs, said he felt satisﬁed and pleased in his retirement speech on 24 
August 2010 (Li 2010a). He revealed that the then premier, Wen Jiabao, 
was very happy about the work of SASAC because Wen only asked for 
the preservation of the state-owned assets, while the SASAC managed 
to expand them rapidly.5 Given this, Li expected the Chinese people 
to appreciate his contributions. However, he was surprised by all the 
criticism directed towards the SOEs and the SASAC, which ranged from 
administrative monopoly to paying little in dividends to the state and to 
corruption in SOEs.6 Li once lamented that 'when the SOEs were man-
aged badly, we were blamed; now they are managed well, but we are still 
blamed. I don't understand why'.7 To resolve Li's puzzle, one has to go 
beyond the nominal performance of the SOEs and probe into the sources 
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of their huge proﬁts to understand the real performance of the SOEs. One 
plausible reason for the puzzle is that there is a huge difference between 
the nominal and the real performance of the SOEs; while Li only knows 
or only talks about the former, the public is concerned about the latter.
The Real Performance of the SOEs
Many people inside and outside China are interested in understand-
ing how the Chinese state-owned sector has been transformed from 
the government's ﬁnancial burden in the 1990s into its 'cash cow' in 
the 2000s. However, where the ever-growing proﬁts of the SOEs come 
from remains an obscure question. Ordinary Chinese people can hardly 
ﬁgure it out but have to accept the ofﬁcial explanation due to the media 
control in China. However, a recent report by the Unirule Institute of 
Economics (2011), a Beijing-based independent think tank, has provided 
an alternative viewpoint that uncovers an untold truth about the super 
proﬁtability of the Chinese SOEs. 
According to this report, four major factors have contributed to huge 
SOE proﬁts, including (1) unpaid rents for nationally owned lands that 
were given to the SOEs for free or at very low prices; (2) unpaid rents 
TABLE 3: Beneﬁts Accrued to the SOEs due to Government  
Favouritism, 2001–2009 (million yuan)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Unpaid 

















217,983 220,101 208,670 309,186 235,078 275,565 350,914 482,184 454,169
Fiscal 
subsidies 26,176 21,401 19,404 18,198 16,657 18,022 17,757 95,551 80,957
Total 649,978 658,014 660,105 780,992 721,842 777,981 927,745 1,165,307 1,154,836
Source: Unirule Institute of Economics (2011).
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TABLE 4: Nominal and Real Proﬁts of Chinese State-owned and State-
holding Enterprises (million yuan)




238,856 263,294 383,620 545,310 651,975 848,546 1079,519 906,359 928,703
Real 
proﬁts
-411,122 -394,720 -276,485 -235,682 -69,867 82,377 161,907 -139,090 -362,544
Source: Unirule Institute of Economics (2011).
for nationally owned natural resources such as oil, natural gas and coal, 
which were extracted by resource-based SOEs at very low prices; (3) 
cheap loans and credits from state-owned banks; and (4) the govern-
ment's ﬁscal subsidies. From Table 3 we can see that from 2001 to 2009, 
on average SOEs paid 833 billion yuan less than what they should have 
paid annually. In total, for the nine years from 2001 to 2009, 7,496.8 billion 
yuan was not paid and instead was appropriated by the SOEs as part of 
their nominal proﬁts. This ﬁgure does not include the unpaid rents for 
other natural resources such as ferrous and nonferrous metals as well 
as license fees for telecommunication resources such as 3G networks. 
If those beneﬁts derived from policies favouring the SOES were 
deducted from the nominal proﬁts, one can see that the real proﬁts of 
Chinese SOEs were in fact negative in all years except two from 2001 
to 2009 (see Table 4). In other words, while the SOEs are making proﬁts 
for the Chinese government, they are making losses for their ultimate 
owners, i.e., the Chinese people. 
Before the publication of this report, voices were raised in the media 
and on the internet that doubted and even challenged the ofﬁcial dis-
course. Especially worth mentioning is the widely publicized debate 
on whether there has been a trend in the Chinese economy whereby 
'the state sector is advancing while the private sector is retreating' (guo 
jin, min tui). On one side of the debate some liberal intellectuals have 
argued that there indeed are some areas in which the state sector ad-
vances while the private sector retreats. On the other side are govern-
ment ofﬁcials and pro-CCP scholars who have argued that no such trend 
exists. It seems that within academic circles, more people sympathize 
with the opinions of the liberal intellectuals. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
government has been resisting criticism and is protecting the SOEs. A 
question remains: why is this so? To answer this question, we need to 
understand the Chinese government's view on the nature, purpose, 
function and boundary of SOEs.
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The Nature, Purpose, Function and Boundary of SOEs
A Normative View
By nature, a state-owned enterprise is fundamentally different from 
a privately owned enterprise. The two differ in four aspects: source 
of initial funds, formation of the ﬁrm, strategic decision making and 
ultimate risk bearing (see Table 5). First, unlike POEs, the initial funds 
for establishing an SOE are from the state's coffers. Since the money 
comes from tax revenues, the taxpayers or all citizens of a nation are 
the ultimate owners of the SOEs, while the state is just the agent of 
the citizens. Second, with regard to formation of a ﬁrm, shareholders 
voluntarily form a POE; but in the case of an SOE, it is the state's will, 
or more precisely, it is the will of some small group of politicians who 
decide on its formation, regardless of the wishes of the real shareholders 
(i.e., the taxpayers). Third, in terms of strategic decision making in the 
ﬁrm, in the case of a POE, the shareholders can participate in person 
or via the board of directors they have selected, while in the case of 
an SOE, it is normally the state that makes the decisions unilaterally 
without consultation with the taxpayers. Finally, when it comes to 
ultimate risk bearing, in the case of a POE, the individual shareholders 
bear limited liability in proportion to their shares; but in the case of an 
SOE, the state often uses tax money to bail out a bankrupt SOE, which 
means that the taxpayers bear unlimited liability for wrongdoings that 
they have nothing to do with. 
The nature of SOEs dictates the purpose of SOEs, which is to better 
serve the people, the real owners of the SOEs, by correcting for market 
deﬁciencies (Chang 2007: 6). The reason is straightforward: a govern-
ment is in principle the agent of the people it governs. This is accepted 
in the West as well as in China where the CCP claims it serves the Chi-
nese people and has no independent interests. So, when a government 
establishes SOEs by using tax money collected from its people, it must 
use the SOEs to serve its people rather than any other purpose, such as 
making proﬁts. 
The nature, purpose, and function of SOEs then determine the bound-
ary of SOEs, namely, SOEs should only undertake those commercial 
activities that the private sector (i.e., individual citizens and private 
enterprises) is unwilling, incapable, or too inefﬁcient to undertake, 
and where national security is involved or people's livelihoods may be 
adversely affected by the potential opportunistic conduct of the private 
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sector. According to the principle of subsidiarity, a higher level of col-
lective organization should not intervene in what a lower level can do. 
Therefore, the SOEs should not enter into commercial areas where the 
private sector can do better and SOEs, whatever their reason for exist-
ence, should gradually exit from commercial activities that the private 
sector is capable of undertaking (Chen 2012). Accordingly, SOEs should 
only exist to provide public goods (which POEs are unwilling to do), 
to undertake large infrastructure projects like national rail networks 
(which POEs are incapable of doing), to run public utilities such as 
water supply and power transmission (as natural monopolies), to run 
military and nuclear industries (in which national security is involved) 
and to be a reactive player as a national grain reserve operator (as 
people's livelihood may be adversely affected by private grain ﬁrms' 
opportunistic behaviour).
The Chinese Government's View 
During Mao's time, under central planning, the SOEs were actually af-
ﬁliated organizations of the government, playing the role of workshops 
of the big national 'factory' as well as working units (danwei) providing 
social welfare to Chinese workers. In the heyday of the Chinese Com-
munist movement, public ownership (i.e. SOEs and collectively owned 
enterprises) was seen as the only legitimate form of economic organi-
zation, and the nature of SOEs was taken for granted and needed no 
discussion. After the reform began, this taken-for-grantedness seems 
to have been inherited to a large extent. This is to say, the Chinese gov-
ernment did not have a clear understanding of the nature of the SOEs. 
The CCP, at its Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee held on 
TABLE 5: Differences between State-owned and Privately-owned 
Enterprises




Source of initial funds Individuals' private money
State ﬁscal revenue, but 
ultimately taxpayer money
Formation of the ﬁrm
Shareholders' voluntary 
behaviour
State's will, regardless of 




in person or via board of 
directors
State unilaterally makes 
decisions, taxpayers not 
involved
Ultimate risk bearing  
Individual shareholders 
bear limited liabilities
State can use tax money 
to bail out SOE, taxpayers 
bear the risks
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22 September 1999, deﬁned the function of state ownership and listed 
four areas to be controlled by state ﬁrms: national security, natural 
monopolies, public goods, and pillar and high-tech industries (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China 1999).
Later, the Chinese government redeﬁned the functions of SOEs, 
reﬂected in the speech of Xi Jinping, China's then vice president, at 
the Conference on Party Building Works of SOEs, held on 17 August 
2009 (Xi 2009). In his speech, Xi commented on the role of SOEs as 'the 
important force of building a well-off society, the important pillar of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and the important basis of CCP's 
ruling'. In accordance with Xi's comment, one can identify four major 
functions with decreasing importance that the Chinese government has 
assigned to the SOEs. 
The ﬁrst one is to justify the claim that China is a socialist country 
by the very existence of SOEs. With the economic reform and opening 
up, over three decades China has been rapidly transformed from one of 
the most egalitarian to one of the most unequal societies in the world. 
After the Chinese government dismantled and marketized the social 
welfare system attached to the SOEs, the only defensive argument the 
Chinese government has in the face of such accusations is that there is 
still a strong and important state-owned economy. 
The second function of SOEs is to provide the ﬁnancial basis for the 
CCP's ruling. To rule the country, the Party needs ideological, material 
and military support. It is generally believed that the communist ideol-
ogy has been losing appeal in China. If military support is the bottom 
line for the CCP's ruling in a time when mass incidents frequently take 
place, then the Party must control enough ﬁnancial resources to have 
a strong and loyal military force. People might wonder why the CCP, 
the only ruling party, needs the SOEs as a source of ﬁnancial support 
as they can have income by taxation. There are at least two reasons. 
First, in principle, tax revenue is subject to ﬁscal budget planning and 
monitoring. Second, in a one-party-ruled country, the ruling party can 
easily transform state-owned assets into Party-owned assets. An exam-
ple of this is the Chinese Nationalist Party (the KMT), which claimed 
massive so-called KMT-owned assets that in fact were state-owned after 
the democratization in Taiwan. 
The third function of SOEs is to be an executor of the Chinese govern-
ment's industrialization strategy. Since the foundation of the People's 
Republic of China, the Chinese government has adopted a state-led, 
investment-driven industrialization strategy. The SOEs seem to have 
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been given major responsibilities to implement such a strategy. Even if 
the SOE sector has dramatically shrunk in terms of its share in the Chi-
nese national economy, the function of implementing the government's 
industrialization strategy has never been undermined. Especially with 
the advent of the global big business revolution since the 1980s (Nolan 
2002), which brings huge challenges to the developing countries, the 
Chinese government has adopted a strategy of creating a 'national 
team' of big SOEs that can participate in international competition for 
resources and markets. 
The fourth function is to serve in the interest of national security and 
the people's livelihood (guo ji min sheng). Although national security 
and people's livelihood should be the most important justiﬁcation 
for the existence and development of SOEs, it seems that the people's 
livelihood is the least important function on the Chinese government's 
agenda. This does not imply that the CCP does not care about the peo-
ple's livelihood, but it has placed more importance on the other three 
functions of the SOEs.
Due to the designated functions of SOEs, the proper boundary/scope 
of SOEs in the eyes of the Chinese government becomes obvious. First, 
no matter how well the private economy is developing and how much 
further the state-owned economy as a percentage of the GDP is reduced, 
there must be some SOEs to represent the publicly owned economy to 
justify the claim that China is socialist but with Chinese characteristics. In 
the words of Li Rongrong, 'no matter how the SOE reform proceeds, the 
leading role of state-owned economy in the national economy will never 
change' (Li 2003). This may explain why the SASAC strongly opposed 
the World Bank's report China 2030, which suggested downsizing the 
Chinese state sector by a new round of SOE restructuring (Caijing 2012). 
Second, for SOEs to be an important source of ﬁnancial support for the 
CCP's rule, they must be proﬁt-making rather than loss-making. Guided 
by the policy of 'grasping the large and letting go of the small', the small 
loss-making SOEs are privatized; the medium-sized SOEs are bailed 
out; and the  large SOEs are ﬁrmly controlled and made proﬁtable at 
whatever cost, including granting them monopoly status and giving ﬁs-
cal subsidies. Third, to implement the government's investment-driven 
industrialization strategies, SOEs now dominate those industries that 
need large-scale investment, such as oil and petrochemicals, railways 
and aerospace. Finally, SOEs ﬁrmly control the military and nuclear 
industries for national security reasons, and SOEs also compete in the 
grain market, which is linked to the Chinese people's livelihood.
66 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31(2)•2013
Xin Li and Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard _____________________________________________
From the above analysis, it seems that the Chinese government will 
do whatever it can to protect and strengthen the SOEs. However, there 
are other factors the CCP has to take into consideration that may con-
strain its policy making and pave the way for further SOE reform in the 
future. One particularly relevant factor is the negative impact of SOE 
favouritism on the Chinese macro economy. 
Negative Impacts of SOE Favouritism on China's Macro 
Economy
The Impact on the Private Sector
Enjoying all sorts of governmental support, Chinese SOEs have been 
competing with privately owned enterprises on an unequal footing. 
Accompanying the rising proﬁts of the SOEs is the deterioration of the 
operating environment of private enterprises. This deterioration is due 
to two major reasons: one is the difﬁculty of access to bank ﬁnance that 
is largely channelled to SOEs, the other is the restriction of entry into 
proﬁtable industries controlled by SOEs. 
In China, the state-owned banks play a dominant role in the ﬁnancial 
market and they favour SOEs in allocating loans and credits because, as 
mentioned above, Chinese SOEs are assigned the function of implement-
ing the state's investment-driven industrialization strategy. In China, 
loans and credits given to SOEs account for a very large share of total 
bank loans and credits. According to the Report on the Development of 
Private Economy in China 2008-2009,8 from 2002 to 2008, the narrow pri-
vate sector (i.e., domestic privately owned and individual businesses) 
only accounted for 13.5 per cent of the total bank loans issued (see Table 
6). Many ﬁnance-hungry small and medium-sized, private enterprises 
often have to resort to private and even underground ﬁnancial markets. 
According to one study (Li 2008, cited in Lardy 2008), by the end of June 
2008, underground lending stood at 10 trillion yuan, equivalent to almost 
a third of the loans extended through the banking system. However, 
the costs of using underground ﬁnancing are very high. Some people 
estimate the average black market lending rate may be as high as 25 per 
cent per year compared to the ofﬁcial lending rate of 6.0 per cent set by 
China's central bank in 2012. 9
Since the 1990s, the Chinese central government has been deregulat-
ing many industries, such as real estate, banking, automotive and coal 
mining, which were once tightly controlled and monopolized by the 
_________________________________________________________________________67
________________________________________________________SOE Reform in China
SOEs. However, Chinese local governments still hold much power in 
determining who can enter into those 'deregulated' industries through 
various policy means. For example, the local governments still control 
land resources and bank loans. Without the support of local govern-
ments, privately owned enterprises can hardly enter into those lucrative 
industries. Even if they are allowed to enter into some industries, the 
privately owned enterprises may soon realize that they are competing 
with SOE giants on an unequal footing. For example, the oil industry 
is one of the most proﬁtable industries in China; however, it is entirely 
monopolized by three state-owned oil companies, each of which controls 
a designated area and they normally do not compete directly with each 
other. Although private enterprises are allowed to enter into the petrol 
retailing segment, they only account for a minor share since the two oil 
giants, PetroChina and Sinopec, have adopted a strategy of aggressive 
acquisition of small and medium-size petrol stations.
A recent report clearly indicates the harsh operating environment of 
Chinese private enterprises. According to the 2010 Analytical Report on 
the Top 500 Private Enterprises published by the All-China Federation 
of Industry and Commerce,10 in 2009, the top 500 private enterprises 
dramatically improved their proﬁtability. However, the proﬁts of the 
500 biggest private enterprises taken together totalled less than that of 
the two largest SOEs: China Mobile and PetroChina.
The Impact on the SOEs
The favourable conditions the SOEs enjoy create huge proﬁts for them. 
But this is an illusion that conceals the truth of the lack of efﬁciency of 
the SOEs. This illusion and the huge proﬁts in turn stimulate all sorts 
of opportunistic behaviour in SOEs that is detrimental to the SOEs and 
further reform.
TABLE 6: Loans Given to the Private Sector in China, 2002–2008  
(in per cent)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Broad private sector 54.1 58.1 58.8 61.3 61.1 59.2 61.1
Domestic private sector 47.3 51.8 52.5 54.6 54.3 49.8 53.0
Narrow private sector 7.4 8.9 7.7 8.2 8.9 13.5 13.0
Note: The broad private sector is deﬁned as the economic segment outside state-owned and 
state-holding enterprises. The domestic private sector is the broad private sector minus the for-
eign-invested enterprises and ﬁrms invested by people from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
The narrow private sector is the domestic private sector minus collectively owned enterprises, 
meaning the privately owned and individual businesses only.  
Source: Huang (2009).
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With the illusion of super-proﬁtability, the managers of the SOEs are 
stimulated to undertake all sorts of opportunistic behaviour such as 
extravagant consumption on the job, giving extra welfare to SOE em-
ployees, conducting speculative investments in real estate and ﬁnancial 
markets and engaging in corruption. 
Consumption on the job includes expenditures on business-related 
travel, meals, telephone bills, training abroad, conferences, company 
cars, etc. Chen, Chen and Wan (2005), based on their analysis of the 
executive remuneration and consumption on the job of the listed 
SOEs from 1999 to 2002, found that on average SOE executives' an-
nual consumption on the job was 12.3 times larger than their nominal 
remuneration. According to Chen, Liang, and Jiang (2010), from 1999 
to 2008, consumption on the job by the executives of China's A-share 
listed companies increased on average three times, while executive 
remuneration increased 4.8 times. 
In 2005, according to the Unirule Institute of Economics (2011: 63), 
the average salary of SOE employees for the ﬁrst time exceeded that 
of other enterprises, and since then the income gap has widened. In 
2008, the weighted average salary of an SOE employee was 17 per cent 
higher than that of an employee in a non-state-owned enterprise. For 
SOE employees, income not included in the salary is an important part 
of the total income; and in some monopolized industries, the percent-
age of income outside wages and salary is as high as 60 per cent of the 
total income. In China, wages and salaries of public sector employees 
are regulated by the government with a stipulated total amount for each 
working unit (danwei). However, this regulated total amount does not 
include expenditures on employee welfare, such as social insurance, 
housing allowance, extra insurance and transfer payments. Therefore, 
many SOEs take advantage of this regulation to give their managers 
and employees extra welfare-type incomes. 
One big part of the extra welfare income is housing welfare. On 29 June 
1998, the Chinese government abolished the welfare housing allocation 
policy, that is, it stopped giving public sector employees free houses as 
a part of employee welfare; instead employees were given cash allow-
ances to buy houses in the housing market. Since 2003, house prices have 
increased rapidly with the boom of housing markets. While many ordi-
nary Chinese people ﬁnd it difﬁcult to afford a ﬂat to live in, many SOE 
employees still enjoy the housing welfare with high market value. This is 
because many SOEs can build their own welfare houses on the free land 
given by the Chinese government and then sell them to their employees 
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at prices much lower than what the markets offer. Some SOEs also sign 
contracts with real estate developers to buy a large number of ﬂats at 
lower-than-market prices and then resell them to their employees. 
With huge proﬁts on hand, many SOEs have started to speculate in 
real estate and ﬁnancial markets as they see such investments as proﬁt-
able. In 2009, 70 per cent of the 136 central SOEs were involved in real 
estate markets, although there are only 16 SOEs whose principal busi-
ness is real estate (Unirule Institute of Economics 2011: 99). With the 
advantage of sufﬁcient capital and access to cheap loans and credits, 
some SOEs behave like predators in real estate markets, often push-
ing land prices to record highs. In 2009, SOEs created several 'kings 
of land', pieces of land with the highest bid price in a city. Whether 
the SOEs who have bid on the 'kings of land' can make proﬁts is not 
clear because of the relatively long cycle of the real estate business. In 
contrast, SOEs' speculation on the ﬁnancial markets can make proﬁts 
or losses quickly. According to the SASAC website, in 2009, 28 central 
SOEs were involved in ﬁnancial derivatives trading, but made more 
losses than proﬁts (Li 2010b). 
With high proﬁts and monopoly status, SOE managers are prone to 
corruption. For instance, in 2009, the CEO of Sinopec, Chen Tonghai, was 
arrested for embezzling 195.7 million yuan;11 in 2010, the vice chairman 
of China Mobile, Zhang Chunjiang,12 and the CEO of the Nuclear Indus-
try Group, Kang Rixin,13 were arrested for receiving bribes of 7.5 million 
and 6.6 million yuan, respectively. However, the Ministry of Railway 
may be the most controversial case. Until March 2013, this ministry was 
the only one that had not separated its administrative and commercial 
functions. In fact, the ministry had long been an 'independent kingdom' 
within the Chinese government, as it combined many governmental 
functions such as military, police, law court, telecommunication and 
universities. It monopolized the construction and operation of railway 
networks. In recent years, the Chinese government has made massive 
investments to extend and upgrade the national rail network. In 2009, the 
Chinese government allocated a quarter of the 4 trillion yuan stimulus 
funds to railway construction. However, in 2010, several top ofﬁcials of 
the ministry, including the minister, Liu Zhijun, and the deputy chief 
engineer, Zhang Shuguang, were arrested on corruption charges. The 
state media said that Liu pocketed more than 64.6 million yuan (US$10.6 
million) in kickbacks from companies that did business with his pow-
erful ofﬁce,14 while Zhang was said to have received 47.5 million yuan 
in bribes.15 At the annual meeting of the National People's Congress in 
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March 2013, the Ministry of Railway was abolished. One part of it was 
merged with the Ministry of Transportation. Another more commercial 
part was turned into an SOE.
The Impact on Society
While a large part of the population has reached middle class status (or 
xiao kang in Chinese), social tensions and grievances have reached an 
alarmingly high level. Here, we focus on two issues, the high and ris-
ing investment rate and the widening income gaps in Chinese society. 
Chinese GDP growth has long been based on two engines, investment 
and export. Due to international pressure on China to reduce its trade 
surplus, the GDP-ﬁxated Chinese government has now placed more 
emphasis on investment. The 'success' of SOEs has boosted the conﬁ-
dence of the Chinese government, which has reinforced belief in the 
correctness of the state-led investment-driven development strategy that 
the government has adopted. The high proﬁts accruing to the SOEs also 
enable the continuation of this investment-based strategy. As a result, 
China's investment rate averaged 37.4 per cent for the period 1978–2008 
(see Figure 1), rising from 36.5 per cent in 2001 to 48.6 per cent in 2010.16
The other side of the high investment rate is the low consumption 
rate. In Figure 2 we can see that the savings rate rose from34.5 per cent 
in 1990 to 51.6 per cent in 2008. It seems there is a vicious circle in the 
Chinese economy: a high investment rate drives down the consumption 
FIGURE 1: China's Investment and Consumption Rates (%), 1978–2010












































________________________________________________________SOE Reform in China
rate and pushes up the savings rate, and the high savings rate enables a 
high investment rate. In the meantime, a high investment rate coupled 
with a low consumption rate produces excess capacity in many indus-
tries; excess capacity has to be channelled into export markets, which 
causes trade frictions. 
Another problem caused by the high investment rate is rising inﬂation. 
In Table 7 we can see that China had rising inﬂation in 2004, 2007–2008 
and 2010–2011. In 2012, the government managed to reduce inﬂation to 
2.6 per cent. In recent years, a major component of the inﬂation has been 
rising food prices, which has caused difﬁculty for many poor Chinese. 
In 2011, the Chinese government made stabilizing price levels a priority 
of macroeconomic management.17
TABLE 7: China's Consumer Price Index, 2001–2012
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
CPI 0.7 - 0.8 1.2 3.9 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.9 - 0.7 3.3 5.4 2.6




From Figure 3, we can see that the labour share in China's GDP (i.e., 
the share of GDP that goes to labour) has been declining since the mid-
1990s. Another source claims that China's labour share peaked in 1983 
FIGURE 2: China's Savings Rate (%), 1978–2008
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at 56.5 per cent and since then has declined for 22 consecutive years, 
decreasing a total of 20 per cent (Caijing 2010). 
The decline of labour's share means the increase of capital's share in 
GDP, which is clearly reﬂected by rising corporate savings in China.
The decline of labour's share with the rise of capital's share in GDP 
has widened the income gap between wage earners and capital own-
ers. In the meantime, due to the proﬁt-seeking nature, a large chunk of 
investment capital has been channelled to the eastern coastal regions 
and manufacturing industries, which further contributes to the widening 
income gap between regions and between sectors. As a result, China's 
Gini coefﬁcient has in general increased since the mid-1980s (see Figure 
4) and has been close to 0.5, above the warning level set by the UN. 
Accompanying this widening income gap has been a rising number 
of 'mass disturbance' incidents in China (see Table 8). In 1993, there 
were 8,700 mass disturbances reported. This ﬁgure rose to 83,600 in 
2005. Probably due to the negative impact of these ﬁgures, the Chinese 
government has stopped publishing the ﬁgure since 2006. However, 
high unofﬁcial estimates have been reported. In today's China, the so-
cial psychology of hatred of rich people and government ofﬁcials has 
emerged. A more serious problem caused by the widening income gap 
is the tendency for many people in a hopeless situation to take revenge 
against society, which is exactly the motive reported for several crimes 
targeting kindergarten children in 2010.
FIGURE 3: China's Labour Share in GDP (%), 1996–2007
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TABLE 8: Number of 'Mass Disturbances' in China
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Incidents 8,700 10,000 11,000 12,000 15,000 25,000 32,000 40,000
Growth 15% 10% 9% 25% 67% 28% 25%
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Incidents n/a 50,400 58,000 74,000 83,600 (90,000) (120,000)
Growth 12% 15% 28% 13%
Sources: Keidel (2006: 3, Table 1); 2006-2008 data are unconﬁrmed estimates (Tong and Lei 2010).
What will the Chinese government do to deal with the severe social-
economic situation? It seems to be a dilemma for the government. On one 
hand, with increasing social tensions and grievances, the CCP feels the 
need to tighten its control of society, which explains why it has dramati-
cally increased the national budget for 'maintaining social stability', which 
exceeded the national defence budget for the ﬁrst time in 2011. On the 
other hand, after 30 years of opening up, Chinese society is much more 
pluralistic and Chinese intellectuals are much more liberal than before 
In addition, the wide use of the internet has made the Chinese public 
more informed and critical, and therefore the CCP is aware that it will be 
increasingly difﬁcult to contain public grievances and to control public 
opinion without changing the policies that caused the very problem. 
After three decades of reform guided by the slogan 'crossing the 
river by touching the stones', China is now at a critical juncture. A 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Various Years).
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recent report by Tsinghua University scholars claims that the Chinese 
government has become so used to 'touching the stones' that it has lost 
the desire for 'crossing the river' (Institute of Social Progress 2012). The 
slow progress of reform is largely due to resistance from the vested 
interests that have grown during the gradualist reform period. Due to 
the complexity of the issue, Chinese leaders tend to avoid directly con-
fronting the problems using the argument of maintaining social stability 
by solving the problem along the process of development. However, 
reality shows that the problems are not avoidable and tend to accumu-
late and become even more difﬁcult to solve as the economy develops. 
One Chinese saying has it that it is less effective to block the ﬂood than 
to channel it. We believe the Chinese government should now directly 
face the problems and take ﬁrm action to solve them. 
The Future: Where Will the New Leadership Take the 
SOE Reform?
In November 2012, Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao to become China's 
new top leader. It is unclear at present how Xi Jinping's personality 
and preferences will shape the direction of the Party's policy making. 
However, the country he is leading is very different from the one Hu 
Jintao took over from Jiang Zemin in 2003. In terms of the economy, 
while it is the world's second largest, it is widely believed to be un-
sustainable.
In November 2013, the CCP will hold its Third Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee. It is unlikely that the new leaders will implement 
radical political reform in their ﬁrst few years due to the political cul-
ture and possible resistance from vested interests; however, the new 
leaders will face many more demands from society than their predeces-
sors. To really maintain social stability, perhaps the right thing for the 
new leaders to do is to further the economic reform. Speciﬁcally, with 
regard to SOE reform, the new leaders should follow the advice of 
the World Bank report, China 2030, to reduce the power and inﬂuence 
of the SOEs and leave more room for privately owned enterprises to 
ﬂourish (World Bank 2012). 
However, we don't see a quick privatization of SOEs as a feasible and 
desirable solution. Given the existence of vested interests and current 
political reality, a rapid privatization of SOEs would result in a situation 
similar to what happened in Russia in the early 1990s during its phase 
of so-called shock therapy, i.e., some powerful people will be able to 
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grab or convert vast state-owned assets into private property. This is 
highly likely given the reality that this is exactly what happened in the 
past privatization process.
Among other things, future SOE reform needs, ﬁrst, to deregulate 
the industries in which SOEs monopolize or dominate, i.e., to intro-
duce competition to SOEs by allowing private ﬁrms to enter into these 
industries; second, to replace CCP-appointed SOE managers with pro-
fessional managers by publicly recruiting talent globally and making 
the new managers accountable not to the Party but to their boards of 
directors and shareholders; and third, to empower the newly recruited 
professional managers to revolutionize corporate management in order 
to gradually get rid of the SOE culture that is characterized by bureauc-
racy, inefﬁciency and complacency. 
Given the resistance from vested interests, it seems that such further 
economic reform necessitates at least a modest political reform. How-
ever, whether the new leaders want and are able to implement such 
political reform is an open question.
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NOTES
1  The concept of planned commodity economy was put forward at the Third Ple-
nary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 
20 October 1984. See People's Daily Online, available from: http://english.people.
com.cn/90002/95589/6512383.html.
2  See the text of the Law at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/02/con-
tent_2637322.htm.
3  This information can be found on the ofﬁcial website of the SASAC. Available 
from: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html.
4  China's state-owned ﬁnancial assets are supervised by the Ministry of Finance.
5  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli-
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tics/2009-12/12/content_12634931.htm.
6  Between 1994 and 2006, Chinese SOEs paid taxes but no dividends to the state. 
From 2007, Chinese SOEs were requested to pay dividends. Most SASAC ﬁrms 
would only remit 5 per cent of their after-tax proﬁts and the maximum 10 per 
cent would apply to only 17 companies (Brødsgaard 2012). From 2011, the Chi-
nese government raised by 5 percentage points the rate of dividends the SOEs 
have to pay to the state.
7  China Xinhua News Agency, available from : http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli-
tics/2009-12/12/content_12634931.htm
8  The report is available at: http://www.china.com.cn/news/zhuanti/
09myjjlps/2009-09/28/content_18621412.htm.
9 See People's Bank of China base interest rate, avaiable from: http://www. 
pbc.gov.cn/publish/zhengcehuobisi/631/2012/20120706181352694274852 
/201200706181352694274852_html
10  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/for-
tune/2010-08/30/c_12497719.htm.
11  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli-
tics/2009-07/15/content_11711240.htm.
12  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/le-
gal/2011-07/22/c_121708021.htm.
13  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/le-
gal/2010-11/20/c_12796129.htm.
14  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/le-
gal/2013-07/08/c_116442565.htm.
15  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/for-
tune/2013-09/10/c_117297357.htm.
16  People's Daily (2011), 'Women neng fou kuaguo zhongdeng shouru xianjing'(Can 
we cross the middle-income trap)' July 25. Available from: http://news.xinhua-
net.com/politics/2011-07/25/c_121715266.htm.
17  China Xinhua News Agency, available from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli-
tics/2011-08/25/c_121912021.htm.
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